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Globalization and the Design of International Institutions 
 
Cary Coglianese 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In an increasingly globalized world, international rules and organizations 
have grown ever more crucial to the resolution of major economic and 
social concerns.  How can leaders design international institutions that will 
effectively solve global regulatory problems?  This paper confronts this 
question by presenting three major types of global problems, distinguish-
ing six main categories of institutional forms that can be used to address 
these problems, and showing how the effectiveness of international 
institutions depends on achieving “form-problem” fit.  Complicating that 
fit will be the tendency of nation states to prefer institutional forms that do 
little to constrain their sovereignty. Yet the least-constraining institutional 
forms are the very ones that will tend to be the least successful in dealing 
with global regulatory problems – especially commons problems and 
threats to human rights. Achieving effective form-problem fit therefore 
depends on creating institutional structures that can give nation-states 
adequate assurance that their interests will not be unduly undermined 
while simultaneously ensuring that global institutions enjoy sufficient 
independence for solving global problems. 
 
 
 
Paper subsequently published in Joseph S. Nye Jr. and John D. Donahue, 
eds., Governance in a Globalizing World 297-318 (Brookings Institution 
Press, 2000).   
 
 
 
 
Globalization and the Design of International Institutions 
 
 
Cary Coglianese* 
 
 
 
 
 The current period of globalization brings with it calls for 
international coordination and collective action.  Expanding markets 
lead to the deepening interdependence of economies and the 
growing demand for coordination in a range of regulatory areas 
including food safety, banking, and product standards.  The 
increasing speed and decreasing cost of global communication 
depends in large part on coordinated international action to ensure 
network compatibility.  Global environmental problems such as 
climate change are also prominent candidates for collective action 
on an international scale.  As the fortunes and fates of people across 
the globe become more closely linked, continued international 
action will be needed to address a variety of global problems.   
  Efforts to solve global problems often center on the creation 
of varied forms of international institutions.  By "institutions," I 
mean both international rules and international organizations.1  
                                                 
*  Associate Professor of Public Policy, Chair of the Regulatory 
Policy Program, and Director of the Politics Research Group at 
Harvard Universitys John F. Kennedy School of Government.  An 
earlier version of this paper was presented at the fourth annual 
Visions of Governance for the Twenty-First Century conference, 
held in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire in July 1999.  A slightly 
revised version of this paper appears in Joseph S. Nye Jr. and John 
D. Donahue, eds., Governance in a Globalizing World 297-318 
(Brookings Institution Press, 2000). 
 
1  See, e.g., Peter Haas, Robert Keohane, & Marc Levy, 
Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International 
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International organizations can be both nongovernmental and 
governmental, though in this chapter my focus is primarily on 
governmental organizations.  Conceived in terms of rules and 
organizations, international institutions have been the subject of a 
significant body of research in the field of international relations.  
Much institutionalist research has focused on why international 
institutions are created and whether they can independently affect 
political behavior in a world dominated by nation-states possessing 
unequal power, divergent interests, and complex domestic politics.2   
 In this chapter, I operate on the premise that institutions can 
indeed affect outcomes and proceed to raise what has been a less-
explored, but no less significant, question:  How does the choice of 
institutional form influence the effectiveness of institutions in 
solving regulatory problems associated with globalization?  My 
purpose is to suggest that the broad design of international 
institutions can impact both their effectiveness in addressing global 
problems and, more importantly, their support from the nation states 
that create them.  In the first part of this chapter I distinguish three 
major types of problems associated with globalization.  In the 
second part, I set out six broad categories of institutional forms 
which nations can use in addressing global problems.  In the final 
part, I bring the problems together with the institutional forms to 
develop an exploratory account of the effectiveness of institutional 
form.  All things being equal, nation-states can be expected to prefer 
institutional designs that impose the least constraint on their 
sovereign legal authority.  However, some of the least constraining 
institutional forms will probably turn out to be ineffective in 
                                                                                                                
Environmental Protection 5 (1993) (defining institutions to "include 
both organizations and sets of rules, codified in conventions and 
protocols that have been formally accepted by states."). 
   
2  For a discussion of the impact of institutions in international 
politics, see John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of 
International Institutions," International Security 19:5-49 (1994/95); 
Robert O. Keohane and Lisa Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist 
Theory," International Security 20:39-51 (1995); John J. 
Mearsheimer, "A Realist Reply," International Security 20:82 
(1995). 
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addressing particular kinds of global problems, especially those 
dealing with commons problems or with the protection of human 
rights.  The challenge in these cases will be to create institutional 
structures that provide adequate assurance to nation-states that their 
interests will not be abused, while at the same time vesting the 
institutions with the degree of independence needed for them to be 
effective in promoting global well-being. 
 
I.  Globalization and Global Problems 
 
 The increasing intensity and extent of global interactions 
brings with it a variety of challenges for governance.  We can 
distinguish three types of problems which accompany globalization 
and prompt calls for international action:  (1) coordination problems, 
(2) commons problems, and (3) problems of core values, such as 
human rights.3   
 Coordination Problems.  The first type of problem is one of 
coordinating global linkages, or exchanges of information, products, 
services, and money across national borders.  When crossing 
national borders means confronting incompatible requirements or 
technologies, this will restrict transnational exchanges that people 
otherwise want to make.  Some coordination problems are 
comparable to deciding what side of the road motorists should use 
or adopting a common unit of time.4  For example, the technological 
advances that have made global communication cheaper depend on 
the inter-operability of networks and telecommunications services in 
different parts of the world.  Another example is the current concern 
about so-called "electronic signatures" for internet transactions.  
Electronic signatures allow firms to authenticate the identity of 
                                                 
3  Although these three categories seem to capture many of the 
major problems that arise under globalization, they are by no means 
exhaustive.  It also bears noting that I have regulatory problems in 
mind in this chapter and expressly leave to the side consideration of 
other important matters such as international security. 
 
4  For a discussion of coordination problems, see Cass 
Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory 
State 53 (1990). 
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contracting partners.  Already a number of authentication 
technologies exist and more will certainly be developed in the 
future.  If different countries require the use of different 
authentication technologies, cross-national electronic trade would 
become more uncertain and cumbersome than if countries adhered 
to a common approach. 
 Coordination problems are of particular concern to 
manufacturers who confront different national regulatory standards.  
National regulations govern both the design and performance of 
products sold within a country (product standards), as well as the 
processes by which products are made (process standards).  Product 
standards can vary in terms of required design features, such as for 
safety or performance, and also in terms of the testing and other 
procedures used to demonstrate that the product meets the 
substantive requirements.  Different design standards can sometimes 
force manufacturers to vary their products for different markets, thus 
diminishing economies of scale.  Even if design standards are 
similar, different testing procedures can lead to additional costs.  For 
example, European and US automobile manufacturers report that the 
costs associated with complying with different standards amount to 
10% of their engineering and design costs.5    
 Of course, the additional costs associated with different 
standards may well be easily justified if they are offset by additional 
benefits.  Differences in standards may reflect different conditions 
or preferences within nation-states which more than justify different, 
even incompatible, standards.  In the absence of offsetting benefits, 
though, variations in regulatory standards tend to reduce 
competition and lead to inefficiencies.6  In these cases, variations in 
product standards might amount essentially to a barrier to entry, 
since domestic firms in markets having excessively costly standards 
may be at an advantage in that market over foreign firms.  In other 
                                                 
5  See "Product Standards, Conformity Assessment and 
Regulatory Reform," in The OECD Report on Regulatory Reform 
(1997). 
 
6  Roger Noll, "Internationalizing Regulatory Reform," in 
Pietro Nivola, ed., Comparative Disadvantage? Social Regulations 
and the Global Economy (1997). 
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cases, firms operating in markets with unduly lax standards for 
manufacturing processes -- such as countries with weak 
environmental or labor safety regulations -- may in essence hold an 
unfair advantage over firms based in countries with higher, socially 
appropriate standards.   In the absence of sound justifications for 
different regulatory standards in different jurisdictions, the costs 
associated with divergent standards can lead to inefficiencies in the 
global allocation of manufacturing and trade. 
 Commons Problems.  A second type of problem associated 
with globalization is the familiar one of protecting common 
resources or public goods.  Public goods or common resources are 
nonrivalrous goods for which it is impossible to exclude anyone 
from using.  Consequently, it is not welfare-maximizing to use a 
pure free market system to allocate their use.  For example, as 
greenhouse gas emissions have increased with the growing use of 
fossil fuels, global warming has emerged as a commons problem.7  
All countries can use the atmosphere as a place in which to release 
emissions, and all benefit from the reduction of greenhouse gases 
regardless of whether they contribute to the reduction.  As a result, 
there is a strong incentive for free riding.  In such cases, 
international institutions, if sufficiently designed, may be able to 
overcome the free rider problem.  
 A related problem is the transboundary effects of otherwise 
domestic activity.  Industry in one country, for example, can 
generate air pollution that moves downwind to another country.   Or 
lax law enforcement in one country may make it a haven for drug 
traffickers or terrorists who stage their operations in other countries.  
In these cases, internal action (or inaction) results in negative 
externalities that are imposed on outside countries.  Since the costs 
are disproportionately borne by others, those producing them have 
little incentive to invest in the measures needed to prevent them.  
Consequently international action may be appropriate in these 
circumstances as well. 
                                                 
7  For an extensive discussion of the political economy of 
climate change, see Jonathan Wiener, "On the Political Economy of 
Global Environmental Regulation," Georgetown Law Journal 
87:749 (1999). 
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 Core Values.  A third type of global problem involves the 
protection of core, or transcendent, values.  Moral principles such as 
equality, liberty, and democracy can be said to transcend current 
political practices.8  Principled claims about rights to treatment with 
dignity and respect inhere in human beings as human beings, and 
not as citizens of a particular country.  Hence, ensuring at least a 
minimal amount of respect for human rights is almost by definition a 
global problem.  Moreover, the current period of globalization may 
be creating conditions under which important social values are 
becoming more widely-accepted across the world.  Globalization 
brings with it the increasing ease in the spread of information and 
ideas, even in heretofore closed political systems.  More people in 
the world today have access to images and ideas from outside their 
own country than ever before.  The increasingly widespread 
exchange of ideas about cultural and political values may well 
contribute to broader acceptance of human rights and democratic 
principles, notwithstanding the positive rights which are (and often 
are not) protected by particular countries.  Since nation-states have 
not uniformly secured justice and protected the rights of their 
peoples, effective international institutions may be needed to help 
guarantee minimal protection of human rights across all nations. 
 Global Problems and the Demand for International 
Institutions.  I have set out three main problems that in some cases 
might justify the establishment of international institutions:  
coordination problems, commons problems, and the protection of 
core values.  To the extent that these problems increase during a 
period of globalization, then the need for international action also 
can be expected to increase.  This does not mean, though, that 
international institutions will automatically arise whenever there is a 
need for them.  Nation-states can still be expected to protect their 
sovereignty and their interests.  Indeed, at the same time that the 
world grows increasingly interconnected on a global scale, many 
nations have seen a striking resurgence of interest in localism and 
decentralization.  In a number of federal systems, there have been 
moves to devolve policymaking from the national to the state or 
                                                 
8  For an argument about basic political principles which all 
well-ordered states would respect, see Rawls, The Law of the 
Peoples (1999). 
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local levels.  In the European Union, the principle of subsidiarity has 
become a symbol of the national and local institutions that appear 
threatened by European integration.  Isolationist political candidates 
in countries around the world stir up resistance to new international 
institutions.  It may well be that as the pace of globalization 
quickens, nation-states and their domestic publics will only become 
more protective of local instruments of governance. 
 Other obstacles to international cooperation, such as the 
incentives for free riding, can also be expected.  There are 
transaction costs to the creation of international institutions.  
Countries need credible information to decide that cooperation will 
serve their interests. 9   In addition, they face the time and expense of 
negotiating with other nations.  Notwithstanding these very real 
obstacles, the number of international institutions has nevertheless 
grown dramatically during the current period of globalization.  The 
last fifty years have witnessed dramatic growth in various measures 
of international cooperation and institution-building including an 
overall increase in intergovernmental exchange, treaties, and 
international governmental organizations.10  At least in the near 
term, we can expect continued interest in developing and 
strengthening international institutions to respond to the problems of 
an increasingly interdependent world, even though building these 
institutions will not occur without difficulty or opposition.    
 
                                                 
9  Once institutions are created, however, they may help reduce 
some of these costs.  Haas, Keohane, & Levy, supra note 1. 
 
10  David Held, Anthony McGrew, David Goldblatt, & Jonathan 
Perraton, Global Transformations 52-57 (1999).  However, the rate 
of growth for some of these institutions, particularly international 
governmental organizations, has not always corresponded directly to 
the pace of globalization.  For example, the number of international 
governmental organizations has declined since the 1980s.  See 
James Hawdon, Emerging Organizational Forms: The Proliferation 
of Regional Intergovernmental Organizations in the Modern World-
System 13 (1996); Cheryl Shanks, Harold Jacobson & Jeffrey 
Kaplan, "Inertia and Change in the Constellation of International 
Governmental Organizations, 1981-1992," International 
Organization 50:593 (1996).  
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II. Forms of International Institutions 
 
 How should international institutions be designed?  Nation-
states have choices in how they respond to global problems.  They 
can choose not to act, leaving open the possibility that norms or 
other coordinating mechanisms will develop through the 
marketplace or through networks of non-governmental 
organizations.  At other times, nation-states can seek to address 
international problems through domestic legislation, either imposing 
domestic standards on products entering its trade or coordinating 
domestic regulations with those of other countries.  Still other times, 
nations can work directly with other nations to develop strategies for 
recognizing each others' internal norms or to create mutually 
acceptable international norms.  In addition, nations also sometimes 
create international organizations possessing delegated authority to 
study global problems, generate recommendations or policies, 
implement programs, or enforce rules and settle disputes.   
 These responses vary in terms of the amount of authority 
which remains vested in the nation-state, as opposed to being 
transferred to other states or international organizations.  Table 1 
summarizes six major options, or institutional forms, countries can 
choose to take in response to global problems, with each form listed 
according to how much policy authority remains with the nation-
state.  In crafting responses to global problems, nation-states can 
choose from among this range of options, and any individual 
country can (and will) engage in many of these options at any given 
time.  If globalization increases the demand for international action, 
we should expect to see greater use of these options, especially those 
involving mutual recognition, consensus, and delegation.  However, 
initially we can expect that countries will tend to respond to new 
global problems with options that least impose upon state 
sovereignty. 
 
- 8 - 
Table 1: Institutional Forms for Responding to Global Problems  
 
 
 
 
Description of 
Institutional Form 
 
Legal Authority Remaining 
at the Nation-state Level 
 
 
Non-State Action 
 
 
Non-state organizations 
or policy networks create 
norms of conduct. 
 
 
All 
 
Internal Control 
 
 
Nation-states exercise 
authority through 
internally-created 
policies. 
 
 
All 
 
Mutual 
Recognition 
 
 
 
Nation-states agree to 
recognize under specified 
conditions the internally-
created policies of other 
nation-states which, in 
turn, reciprocate with 
recognition. 
 
 
All, but under certain  
conditions the nation-state 
acquiesces in the authority of 
other nation-states. 
 
Consensual Rules 
 
 
 
Nation-states consent to 
international policies 
created through 
negotiation with other 
nation-states. 
 
 
All, but authority is 
constrained by bargaining 
process with other nation-
states. 
 
Delegation 
 
 
 
Nation-states delegate 
policy authority to 
international institutions.  
Delegations can be loose 
or tight. 
 
 
 
Some 
 
Withdrawal 
 
 
 
Nation-states abandon or 
cede their policy authority 
altogether to another state 
or institution. 
 
 
 
None 
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 Non-State Action. The first option is for nation-states to take 
no action whatsoever, thereby leaving a global problem either 
unresolved or allowing non-state actors to attempt to solve it.  The 
absence of state intervention does not necessarily mean that the 
global problem will persist unaddressed, for markets, transnational 
social norms, and private standard-setting organizations may step in 
to try to solve or prevent certain kinds of global problems.11 
 Market dynamics can sometimes lead to coordinated action.  
In the absence of any formal product standards, markets may settle 
on a de facto industry standard.  The dominance of the Windows 
operating system as a standard for PC software development, for 
example, has arisen from the market dominance of Microsoft rather 
than from any particular governmental standard.  Even in the face of 
different governmental standards, though, manufacturing practices 
may still converge (on the most stringent standard) if it is cheaper 
for companies to meet that standard than to design different 
products.  
 Social norms can also serve a regulatory function.12  In the 
international realm, networks of professionals and other elites can 
diffuse norms even in the absence of intervention by nation-states.  
Norms may also be generated or sustained by domestic publics.  
Current protests against labor conditions in Third World clothing 
factories, for example, hold the potential for entrenching norms 
about the treatment of workers by multinational corporations 
operating in developing countries.   
 Private standard-setting organizations promote coordination 
among international businesses without intervention by the state.  
The International Electrotechnical Commission and the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO) are both international, 
                                                 
11  Cf. Lawrence Lessig, "The New Chicago School," Journal of 
Legal Studies 27:661 (1998). 
 
12  Research on social norms is vast.  For recent discussion of 
norms in the legal literature, see Robert C. Ellickson, Order without 
Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (1991) and Cass Sunstein, 
"Social Norms and Social Roles," Columbia Law Review 96:903 
(1996). 
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nongovernmental standard-setting organizations.  ISO standards 
"govern" a broad range of products and business practices, from film 
speed to corporate environmental management systems.   
 Even though non-state norms may emerge from private 
standard-setting bodies, markets, and social networks, this does not 
mean that these norms will always be followed.  Without the 
involvement of the state and its enforcement mechanisms, norms 
can be relatively easy to ignore when the costs of compliance get 
high.  On the other hand, to the extent that norms penetrate 
throughout social networks and become internalized by leaders and 
publics across the world, their effects potentially could be quite 
significant.13   
 Internal Control.  The second option is for nation-states to 
exercise control through their own internal lawmaking processes.  
This approach maintains the maximum domain of a nation-state's 
sovereign authority, but it is limited by the national reach of that 
sovereign jurisdiction and by the likelihood that different states will 
adopt different standards.  The global problems set forth in Part I of 
this chapter are vexing precisely because nation-states are ill-
equipped on their own to promote coordination, preserve global 
commons, and protect core values.   
 This does not mean that internal control can never affect 
international problems.  Long-arm legislation is sometimes used to 
extend a nation-state's domestic authority beyond its borders, 
regulating outside firms that engage in transactions with residents.  
Moreover, under some circumstances, nation-states may be able to 
coordinate their internally-created policies by following what other 
nation-states do.  Countries with large economies, or especially high 
reputations for effective governance, may function as regulatory 
leaders that other nations follow, thus resulting in some regulatory 
convergence without formal efforts at international coordination.14  
However, harmonization without international cooperation is time-
                                                 
13  See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Soft Power," Foreign Policy 153 
(Fall 1990). 
 
14  See David Vogel, Trading Up: Consumer and Environmental 
Regulation in a Global Economy (1995). 
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consuming and cumbersome.  There are hardly any guarantees that 
nations will align their policies with each other. 
 Even if internal control is limited in the face of transnational 
problems, the actions of national governments do remain vital to 
nearly every approach to addressing global problems.   Even when 
international institutions are needed to allow states to solve global 
problems, these institutions almost always depend on national 
decisions for their implementation.15  For example, treaties will 
often require implementing legislation, and national governments 
are often responsible for monitoring and enforcement of 
international rules within their borders.  It would be inaccurate, 
therefore, simply to juxtapose internal control with international 
control.  What distinguishes internal control from the remaining 
institutional forms is the absence of any international institutional 
coordinating mechanism, such as an agreement, treaty, or 
international governmental organization.   
 Mutual Recognition. The third form of international 
institutions, mutual recognition, involves the acceptance of 
coordinating principles by nation-states under which they recognize, 
under certain circumstances, the policies adopted by other nation-
states.16  This approach provides a basis for determining which rules 
should apply to transactions that involve firms or individuals from 
different countries.  Two or more countries adopting mutual 
recognition each maintain internal control within their respective 
borders, but agree to a set of principles that will govern situations 
which involve an interaction between the countries.  So, for 
example, Nation A may agree to permit the sale of certain products 
that meet Nation Bs safety standards, even though they do not meet 
the precise standards set by Nation A for products produced within 
its borders.  The recognition is mutual when Nation B then agrees to 
permit the sale of Nation As products within Nation B.   
 Mutual recognition agreements have been used most notably 
in Europe, where member states of the European Union recognize 
                                                 
15  See Haas, Keohane, & Levy, supra note 1, at 16-17.  
 
16  See Kalypso Nicolaïdis, "Mutual Recognition of Regulatory 
Regimes: Some Lessons and Prospects," in OECD, Regulatory 
Reform and International Market Openness (1996). 
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products manufactured in each other's jurisdictions.  The EU has 
also pursued bilateral negotiations with Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada, Japan, and the US.   At the present, mutual recognition 
negotiations have tended to center around bilateral negotiations on 
specific products, such as food, medical devices, and 
telecommunications equipment. 17  In these negotiations, a key issue 
for nations has been to ensure that there is a measure of equivalency 
in the regulatory standards in the nations that would fall under the 
mutual recognition agreement.  Hence, mutual recognition is an 
option available mainly to those countries that have already 
achieved a measure of regulatory convergence. 
 Consensual Rules.  Consensual rules -- treaties -- are the 
fourth form of international institutions.  Through the creation of 
international treaties or covenants, nation-states commit themselves 
not just to recognize each others' domestic rules, but actually to 
create a new set of common, transnational rules. 18  While treaties 
seldom are backed by a formal enforcement mechanism,19 they 
remain a frequently-used form of international cooperation.  More 
                                                 
17  See "Product Standards, Conformity Assessment and 
Regulatory Reform," in The OECD Report on Regulatory Reform 
(1997); National Research Council, Standards, Conformity 
Assessment, and Trade: Into the 21st Century (1995). 
 
18  Of course, with multilateral treaties, it is always possible for 
nation states to adopt reservations to the treaty, so the precise 
obligations imposed by a treaty may still vary from state to state.  
For a discussion of the challenges created by reservations, see David 
M. Leive, International Regulatory Regimes 133-52 (1976). 
 
19  See Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, "Compliance 
Without Enforcement: State Behavior under Regulatory Treaties," 
Negotiation Journal 7:311 (1991); Abram Chayes & Antonia 
Handler Chayes, "On Compliance," International Organization 
47:175 (1993). 
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than 34,000 treaties are registered with the United Nations, with 
more than 500 of these being major multilateral treaties.20     
 Since each nation-state must consent to the policies 
contained in the treaty, policy authority still remains embedded 
within the nation-state.21  In practice each nations decision will be 
constrained to some degree by the bargaining process, as what 
emerges in a treaty may not be identical to each nations first best 
policy choice.  Powerful states also tend to dominate weaker states.  
However, each state still possesses full authority to decide whether 
to agree to the treaty.  This preservation of authority comes at its 
price, of course, as rulemaking based on consensus can be time 
consuming, subject to the lowest common denominator effect, and 
biased in favor of the status quo.22 
 Delegation.  The fifth institutional form, delegation, is a 
special form of consensual rulemaking and it theoretically holds the 
promise of overcoming the limitations inherent in negotiating 
multilateral treaties.  When countries delegate authority, they 
consent to the transfer of authority to an international organization 
to take specific actions.23  The organization can take actions on its 
own accord, so countries need not negotiate treaty language to 
govern every decision needed to address a complex problem.  In this 
way, international organizations can provide a forum for ongoing 
international cooperation.  By the mid-1990s, national governments 
                                                 
20  Thanks to advances in global communication, a database of 
all the treaties deposited with the United Nations can now be found 
on-line at: http://untreaty.un.org/English/access.asp. 
 
21  Robert Keohane, "The Demand for International Regimes," 
in Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes (1983). 
 
22  See Cary Coglianese, "Is Consensus an Appropriate Basis 
for Regulatory Policy?" in Eric Orts & Kurt Deketelaere, eds., 
Environmental Contracts: Comparative Approaches to Regulatory 
Innovation in the United States and Europe (2000). 
 
23  In this section, I am specifically concerned with international 
governmental organizations, since non-governmental organizations 
do not depend on delegated authority from nation-states.  
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had created more than 250 international governmental organizations. 
24  Among these are such well-known organizations as the United 
Nations, European Union, and World Trade Organization (WTO), 
along with many lesser-known organizations including the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission (which issues international food safety 
standards) and the International Telecommunications Commission 
(which sets standards for telecommunications services).  Nation-
states have established these and other international organizations to 
take a range of actions, from studying transnational problems and 
issuing recommendations, to creating or implementing transnational 
policy, to enforcing policy and settling disputes between countries.   
 Delegation does not mean that nation-states completely give 
up their authority over a policy issue to an international 
organization.  Indeed, national leaders can be expected to ensure that 
their countries interests will not be undermined by any new 
institutions that they create at the international level.25   As such, 
countries will delegate with caution, paying attention to the terms of 
any delegation and the decision-making structure of the new 
institution.  In this respect, national leaders' concerns about 
delegating authority to international organizations are not unlike 
those of a legislature delegating authority to an administrative 
agency or of any private actor delegating business or other 
decisionmaking authority to a third party.  In such cases, tensions 
can arise between the interests of the nations delegating their 
authority and the interests of the organization receiving this 
authority.  This is the well-known principal-agent problem, where 
the potential exists for the agent to act in ways that do not conform 
with the goals of the principal.  The goals of the WTO, for example, 
may center more on the maintenance of competitive markets than 
some member countries and their publics are willing to accept, 
especially if the promotion of free trade comes at the expense of 
                                                 
24  Held, et al., supra note 10, at 53. 
 
25  Leaders can be expected to protect their own institutional 
power and this may make them wary of creating powerful 
international institutions.  Domestic publics concerned about a lack 
of sovereignty and democratic accountability may also encourage 
leaders to be cautious in creating international institutions. 
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other social values, such as perhaps the environment or indigenous 
cultures.  For any individual country, the question must arises before 
it gives authority to an international organization:  To what extent 
will the decisions made by the organization diverge from the overall 
interests of the nation? 
 Since international organizations are created by the consent 
of those nations who will be subject to the organization's authority, 
we can expect the structure of international organizations to bear 
similarities to delegations of authority in other contexts, such as 
legislative delegations to administrative agencies. 26   In order to 
minimize the potential for agents to act in ways incompatible with 
the interests of their principals, delegations often include measures 
designed to allow principals to monitor and control the actions of 
their agents.27  Delegations of governmental authority are often 
accompanied by one or more similar features designed to constrain 
the discretion of the organization to which authority is being 
transferred.  These four features can be grouped into four categories: 
(1) delineation, (2) monitoring, (3) sharing, and (4) reversibility. 28  
                                                 
26  See, e.g., David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, Delegating 
Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policymaking 
under Separate Powers (1999); Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, 
and Barry Weingast, "Administrative Procedures as Instruments of 
Political Control," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 
3:243 (1987); Matthew McCubbins, Roger Noll, and Barry 
Weingast, "Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: 
Administrative Agencies and Political Control," Virginia Law 
Review 75:431 (1989). 
 
27  For an overview, see John Pratt and Richard Zeckhauser, 
"Principals and Agents: An Overview" in John Pratt and Richard 
Zeckhauser, Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business 
(1985). 
 
28  For a discussion of these four features in the context of 
federalism, see Cary Coglianese & Kalypso Nicolaïdis, Securing 
Subsidiarity: Legitimacy and the Allocation of Governing 
Authority" in Kalypso Nicolaïdis and Robert Howse, eds., The 
Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the US and 
the EU (Oxford University Press, in press). 
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Delineation refers to the standards or principles setting forth the 
jurisdiction of the organization -- its scope, tasks, and functions.  
Monitoring encompasses those procedures that ensure decision-
making is transparent and that require certain kinds of analysis and 
reporting to be conducted before making decisions.  Sharing 
arrangements provide for the involvement and representation of 
member states in the organizational decision-making process.  
Reversibility refers to escape clauses by which countries can 
withdraw from the jurisdiction of the organization under certain 
circumstances. 
 The way each of these features is constructed in specific 
cases will affect what might be considered the tightness of the 
delegation.  Delegations can be tight or loose, depending on the 
nature of their delineation, monitoring, sharing, and reversibility.  
Delineations can be specific or general.  Monitoring can be 
extensive or limited.  Sharing arrangements can require full consent 
of all member states or something less than full representation or 
unanimity.  The conditions for reversibility can be ones that can be 
easily met or ones which require a compelling case.  The tighter the 
delegation, the more control countries retain over the decisions and 
direction of international organizations.  The looser the delegation, 
the more discretion the organization possesses. 
 Withdrawal.  A final institutional form is worth noting, 
though perhaps more for theoretical symmetry than for its use in 
practice.  The option of withdrawal lies at the opposite end of the 
spectrum from options in which legal authority rests solely within 
the nation-states.   With withdrawal, a nation-state gives up or 
transfers its claim to policy authority altogether.  It either abandons 
its exercise of authority or makes a complete, irreversible delegation 
to another institution.  The main instances of withdrawal occur when 
nation-states merge or are subsumed by other states, such as with the 
recent German reunification.29  Otherwise, the option of withdrawal 
                                                                                                                
 
29  International treaties disavowing sovereign claims over 
Antarctica and outer space are akin to a withdrawal, although in 
these cases no nation possessed full sovereignty over these 
territories in the first place.  See The Antarctica Treaty, 12 U.S.T. 
794 (Dec. 1, 1959); The Outer Space Treaty, 18 U.S.T. 2410 (Jan. 
27, 1967). 
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remains largely an aspiration of those who advocate so-called 
"world government" as a replacement for a system of governance 
organized around nation-states.  When it comes to dealing with 
global problems, the main action will continue to revolve around 
non-state actors, nation-states, and international negotiations over 
mutual recognition, consensual rules, or delegations to international 
organizations. 
 
 
III. The Choice and Impact of Institutional Form 
 
 
 The nations of the world have numerous options available to 
them for responding to global problems.  As I have just set forth, 
nations can choose from six broad categories of institutional forms.  
Within each of these broad institutional forms, there is also a myriad 
of more specific policy choices.  I have said virtually nothing, for 
example, about the substance of treaties: the different kinds of 
requirements that nations can agree upon in seeking to solve 
different kinds of problems.  The specific requirements within 
treaties are obviously the subject of intense negotiations, and we 
know that some types of requirements turn out to be more effective 
than others.  Ronald Mitchell has shown that, in a treaty designed to 
prevent oil tanker pollution, provisions which required tankers to 
install specific equipment were more effective in inducing 
compliance than were provisions which specified discharge limits.30  
Choices such as these -- between technology-based and 
performance-based standards, or between any number of other types 
of regulatory approaches -- will almost certainly matter in affecting 
the performance of international rules.  For the sake of this analysis, 
though, I would like to distinguish these kinds of "operational" 
choices from choices about broader institutional form.  After all, 
performance-based or technology-based standards could in principle 
be adopted in domestic legislation, recognized in a mutual 
                                                                                                                
 
30  Ronald Mitchell, "Regime Design Matters: Intentional Oil 
Pollution and Treaty Compliance," International Organization 
48:425 (1994). 
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recognition agreement, codified by treaty, or proposed by an 
international governmental organization.  The question I pose here is 
whether these various institutional forms matter, all things being 
equal, in terms of effectively addressing global problems. 
  By the effectiveness of institutional form, I mean both (1) 
the extent to which the international institution's design contributes 
to the solution of the global problem which it was intended to help 
solve (policy effectiveness), and (2) the political legitimacy of the 
institution and the support it garners from national governments and 
their domestic publics (political effectiveness).  I draw attention here 
to legitimacy as a separate conception of effectiveness because 
institutions that lack legitimacy are unlikely to be able to work 
effectively in terms of the first conception.  As Dani Rodrik has 
cautioned in connection with the globalization of markets, 
"[i]nstitutions that lose their legitimacy can no longer function."31  
This is particularly the case with international institutions which 
depend on national governments for their continued existence and 
for the implementation and enforcement of international rules. 
  In this final part of this chapter, I seek to bring together the 
three types of global problems discussed in the first part of the 
chapter with the institutional forms discussed in the second part.  I 
show how certain institutional forms seem to fit better with certain 
types of global problems and hypothesize that this fit influences the 
policy effectiveness of international institutions.  I further suggest 
that the institutional form is related to the political effectiveness, or 
legitimacy, of the institution.  As with any claims about the 
effectiveness of policies and institutions, these are all subject to 
testing with empirical research. 32 Nevertheless, an initial step along 
the path toward empirical testing is to generate hypotheses about 
how the form of international institutions may be related to policy 
effectiveness and political legitimacy. 
                                                 
31  Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone Too Far? (1997). 
 
32  Such tests can be difficult to make because, as Robert 
Keohane and Lisa Martin have noted, "[r]arely, if ever, will 
institutions vary while the 'rest of the world' is held constant."  
Robert O. Keohane and Lisa Martin, supra note 2, at 47. 
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 Form-Problem Fit.     In the first part of this paper, I 
distinguished between problems of coordination, commons, and core 
values that arise acutely in a period of globalization.  If institutional 
form makes a difference in how effectively international institutions 
can solve these problems, then analysts and policymakers will need 
to take care in selecting the institutional forms to be used in 
addressing the different kinds of problems.   They will need, in other 
words, to make sure that the institutional form fits the problem that 
needs to be solved. 
 Coordination problems will probably not be easily solved by 
the first two forms shown in Table 1: (1) non-state action and (2) 
internal control.  While it is possible for coordinated behavior to 
develop without international agreements of any kind,33 the problem 
of coordination is most salient when nation-states have already 
internally adopted incompatible regulations.  In cases where 
standards are already divergent, and where the divergence is not 
justified, nation-states will most likely need to take some form of 
collective action if they are to resolve the incompatibility.  
Consensual treaty-making would work, since agreement on treaty 
language (without any significant reservations) will forge a common 
set of standards.  However, in some cases, reaching consensus on 
common standards will prove to be difficult, especially if nation-
states are trying reconcile more than two divergent standards into 
one common treaty.  Delegating the task of coordination to a group 
of experts could help break deadlock, assuming agreement could be 
reached on how the expert commission would be established.   
 A potentially more feasible approach would be for the 
various nation-states to negotiate mutual recognition treaties with 
each other.  As noted in Part II, mutual recognition can require an 
initial degree of regulatory convergence.  As long as the various 
standards are roughly equivalent, countries may be willing to use 
mutual recognition to achieve coordinated trade.  A mutual 
recognition agreement would probably be easier to achieve because 
it would not require nation-states to change their own existing 
standards or testing procedures, or demand that negotiators come to 
a complete meeting of the minds on a common set of detailed 
standards. 
                                                 
33  Robert Axelrod, Evolution of Cooperation (1984). 
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 It is harder to see how mutual recognition could help address 
commons problems or problems of core values.  Of course, internal 
control cannot be expected to solve these problems either because 
the problems stem from actions by individual nation-states either to 
permit the depletion of a public good or the violation of a core 
value.  With commons problems, individual nation-states are less 
likely unilaterally to internalize the social costs of their actions.  The 
most promising option for commons problems, and perhaps also for 
problems of core values, would seem to be treaty-making, which 
could establish credible rules (and perhaps authorized sanctions) to 
facilitate cooperation.  Not surprisingly, this has been the strategy 
nation-states have pursued recently on environmental issues such as 
ozone and climate change, leading with mixed results to the 
Montreal Protocol34 and the Kyoto Protocol,35 respectively.  In the 
course of climate change negotiations, delegation (as an institutional 
form) has come into play with the creation of organizations such as 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change that provide 
scientific assessment information that can be used in the course of 
further treaty negotiations.  Delegations to organizations charged 
with studying and reporting recommendations may help generate 
information that can feedback into processes for creating other 
institutional forms. 
 As noted earlier, the internal decisions of nation-states do 
remain important to policy success even when international 
institutions are created to address global problems.  In the context of 
human rights and other core values, nation states may well enter into 
international treaties but not honor them when dealing with heated 
domestic conflicts or, in some cases, even in the ordinary course of 
affairs.  These challenges certainly can arise outside the realm of 
human rights too, but the nature of an international system which 
protects national sovereignty in "internal" affairs can make it 
especially difficult to enforce treaties which essentially protect 
                                                 
34  Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
Layer, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 (Jan. 1, 1989). 
 
35  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
FCCC/CP/7/Add.1 (issued Mar. 25, 1998), reprinted at 37 I.L.M. 22 
(1998). 
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citizens from their own governments.  For these reasons, as well as 
for other reasons such as the lowest common denominator problem, 
international institutional forms can sometimes turn out to be weak 
and ineffectual.  In such cases, it bears returning to non-state action 
as a potentially viable, long-term strategy.   The pressures of non-
governmental actors and the acceptance of soft law and non-state 
norms by domestic elites and publics may take time, and may often 
exhibit little progress, but this approach may ultimately hold the 
most promise for creating better conditions for solving global 
problems and building effective international institutions.   
 Form and Legitimacy.  The importance of the nation-state in 
the creation and implementation of international institutions makes 
political support and legitimacy a key facet of institutional 
effectiveness.  However, international institutions are not unique 
when it comes to the need to take politics into account.  Domestic 
policymaking is also very much the art of the possible, aiming for 
the most effective policy among those that are politically feasible.  
Moreover, in both domestic and international contexts, authority 
will be most effective when it is perceived as legitimate authority.   
Although national governments have centralized police and court 
systems, the state cannot be watching every person's every move.  
Compliance is certainly affected by the existence and use of 
monitoring and sanctions, but it is also influenced by internalized 
moral norms and the perceived legitimacy of the regulatory 
institution.36  
 An institution's legitimacy or public support can be both 
specific and diffuse.37  Specific legitimacy refers to the acceptance 
                                                 
36  For an extensive discussion of compliance, see Tom Tyler, 
Why People Obey the Law (1990). 
 
37  The distinction between specific and diffuse legitimacy is a 
familiar one in evaluating domestic governmental institutions, such 
as the Supreme Court. For a recent debate on the legitimacy of the 
Supreme Court, see James Gibson, "Understandings of Justice: 
Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice, and Political 
Tolerance," Law & Society Review 23: 469 (1989); Tom Tyler & 
Kenneth Rasinski, "Legitimacy, and the Acceptance of Unpopular 
U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: A Reply to Gibson," Law & Society 
Review 25: 621 (1991); James Gibson, "Institutional Legitimacy, 
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of the outcomes generated by that institution in particular instances.  
Someone who disagrees with the WTO's US-Shrimp action38 would 
view the trade body as having little specific legitimacy in that case.  
However, that same person could still view the WTO with diffuse 
legitimacy if she concluded that the procedures used by the body 
were fair and reasonable, or that over the long term the outcomes are 
or will be generally the right ones, even if in some particular cases 
the WTO made mistakes.  A major challenge for the WTO at present 
seems to be how to strengthen and broaden its diffuse support 
among the public during a time when it has been issuing decisions 
that have been met with substantial criticism. 
 More research would be needed to understand the full range 
of determinants of diffuse legitimacy of international institutions.  
One factor that could affect support for international institutions is 
the degree of sovereignty the institution preserves or protects for the 
nation-state.  We might predict that, all things being equal, those 
institution-building efforts that least impose restrictions on state 
sovereignty will be perceived as more legitimate.  Consequently, 
those institutional forms that preserve sovereignty the most would 
tend to garner the most political support from nation-states: internal 
control will generally be preferred over mutual recognition, 
consensual rulemaking over delegation.  Things are not always 
equal, of course, and there may be times when states will see that 
the benefits of delegating authority to global regulatory 
organizations are greater than the costs, such as presumably has 
happened with the WTO.  Yet, for right or wrong, intense debate has 
emerged about the nature the WTO's institutional structure and 
whether the institution has too much independent authority.  Since 
the effects of international institutions can be difficult to determine -
                                                                                                                
Procedural Justice, and Compliance with Supreme Court Decisions: 
A Question of Causality," Law & Society Review 25:631 (1991). 
 
38  World Trade Organization, United States-Import Prohibition 
of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Oct. 12, 1998, 
WT/DS58/AB/R, reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 118, 121 (1999) (adopted 
Nov. 6, 1998) (appellate body report).  In this action, the WTO body 
found that the United States' efforts to protect endangered sea turtles 
violated trade rules. 
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- since we do not have a control group with different institutional 
forms -- the challenge is to decide whether the WTO could achieve 
its free trade goals as effectively if its institutional structures were 
more transparent and tightly linked. 
 The Delegation Dilemma.  The recent controversy over the 
WTO simply highlights a more general challenge for delegation as 
an institutional form.  In an increasingly interdependent world, the 
need for delegation may grow to respond more rapidly to global 
problems.  Delegating authority to international organizations, 
however, runs into two potential limitations.  The first potential 
limitation is that the organization will be too constrained.  The more 
narrowly delineated an organization's authority, for example, the 
harder it may be for that organization to respond to problems that 
change over time or to address unanticipated problems that do not fit 
neatly into the delineated categories.  Another way an organization 
can be constrained is in how independently it can make decisions.  
In organizations where authority is shared coterminously  (i.e., 
where decisions of the organization must be made with the consent 
of all the member states), the organization may become hobbled 
since fully coterminous organizations do not really possess 
delegated authority at all.  They simply provide a forum for 
international consent to take place.  Requiring unanimous consent of 
all the member states basically institutionalizes the underlying 
collective action problems that delegation possibly could have 
solved.39  Organizations that are tightly constrained in these ways 
will be less capable of responding to problems in a timely, effective 
manner. 
 The second potential limitation to delegations, though, is that 
they will be too unconstrained.  If nation-states in fact cede a lot of 
unconstrained authority, international organizations will be better 
poised to respond effectively to new and challenging problems.  But 
they will also be better empowered to make mistakes or act in ways 
contrary to the interests of some member states.  International 
organizations that are too powerful, and which exercise their power 
carelessly, can lose legitimacy among the nation states that created 
these institutions.  Nation states may therefore resist the work of 
                                                 
39  See Haas, Keohane, & Levy, supra note 1, at 417. 
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organizations that become too powerful or may invoke reversibility 
provisions to withdraw from under the purview of these institutions. 
 In other words, a tension may often exist for international 
governmental organizations between policy effectiveness and 
political effectiveness.  A balance must be achieved between 
creating organizations that are sufficiently independent to operate 
effectively and maintaining the support of nation-states which are 
understandably wary of the powers possessed by new organizations. 
Any new organization's authority must be sufficiently 
unencumbered to make the organization capable of solving global 
problems yet also sufficiently encumbered to make the organization 
acceptable to the nation states who must agree to establish and 
maintain it.  In order to optimize along these two dimensions, 
nation-states can seek to exploit different combinations of the four 
features of delegation described above.  For example, nation-states 
can be predicted to require less sharing of decisions in organizations 
that contain narrowly delineated jurisdictions.  As a result, 
organizations established to address relatively narrowly defined 
global problems may well depend less on power sharing or 
monitoring.  However, organizations which are established to 
address a broad range of policy issues -- institutions like the EU -- 
will be based on more extensive arrangements for sharing power 
with member states. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 Finding the appropriate balance between control and 
discretion in delegating authority to international institutions will 
take time, experimentation, and learning.  Indeed, such a balance 
may really never be found at all as new problems will arise that 
seem to require more control or more discretion, and ideas will 
change about the proper location of policy authority.   Of course, it 
is the presence of change that will probably make the choice of 
institutional forms all the more important.  In a world with both 
changing problems as well as changing ideas about how to solve 
those problems, arrangements will be needed that allow nation 
states to create international rules and organizations -- as will be 
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arrangements that give nation-states flexibility to redirect these new 
institutions when a change in course seems needed to fit better the 
problems at hand. 
 We should expect international institution-building to result 
in a use of varied institutional forms.  Such variation provides 
opportunities for further research, as not all institutional forms will 
work equally well with different kinds of global problems.  A 
transition from a system of dominance based on nation-state 
authority to one based on even more complex and interdependent 
global relationships has already begun, but it will also continue to 
move in fits and starts.  Although the conditions of globalization 
would seem increasingly to make it in states interests to cooperate 
and perhaps even to delegate to international institutions, national 
leaders will always need to be convinced that new institutions will 
indeed be used to their nations overall benefit.  We might see 
greater importance given to mutual recognition agreements, treaties, 
and international organizations.  But when new international 
institutions result in unpopular decisions that adversely affect 
powerful nation-states -- even if these decisions are otherwise in the 
overall global interest -- it will have an effect on the future 
development of additional international institutions.  Similarly, 
when international institutions appear to be ineffectual in the face of 
pressing global problems, that too will have an effect on future 
institutional development. Any transition to a so-called new world 
order will not be a smooth one.  However, over time, we can hope 
that institutional forms will be used in ways that seem to strike the 
appropriate balance, at least for some extended period. 
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